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Modelling the Role of History in Industrial Organization and Competition

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Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare

Abstract

Our objective in this chapter is to describe some recent developments in the area of industrial organization pertaining to the role of history in industrial competition.

The authors gratefully acknowledge helpful conversations with Drew Fudenberg. This paper was prepared while the first author was at the Graduate School of Business, Stanford University. We are grateful to the National Science Foundation for financial support.

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Authors
  1. David M. Kreps
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  2. A. Michael Spence
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Tennessee, USA

    George R. Feiwel (Alumni Distinguished Service Professor and Professor of Economics) (Alumni Distinguished Service Professor and Professor of Economics)

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© 1985 George R. Feiwel

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Kreps, D.M., Spence, A.M. (1985). Modelling the Role of History in Industrial Organization and Competition. In: Feiwel, G.R. (eds) Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06876-0_10

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