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The Relevance of Sea-Power

  • James Cable

Abstract

Before attempting to examine the prospective utility to Britain of the Royal Navy it seems desirable to consider briefly the general relevance of sea-power in a world that has undergone profound changes, political as well as technological, in the thirty-six years — the longest period in modern history — that have elapsed since two fleets last met in naval battle.

Keywords

Naval Force Prospective Utility Naval Officer Naval Warfare Naval Power 
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Notes

  1. 1.
    Grant Hugo, Britain in Tomorrow’s Worl. (Chatto & Windus, 1969) p. 227.Google Scholar
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    A recent writer has given this scenario somewhat extreme expression. ‘By about 1982 it is expected that, by using only about a quarter of its total ICBMs in a surprise attack, the Soviet Union would be able to destroy all but a few of the American ICBMs, plus all SLBMs at [si.] port and heavy bombers that have been unable to fly from their bases.’ Lawrence Freedman, Britain and Nuclear Weapon. (Macmillan, 1980) p. 106.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    John Erickson and E. J. Feuchtwanger (eds), Soviet Military Power and Performanc. (Macmillan, 1979) p. 34.Google Scholar
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    The Office of Technology Assessment reported that a Soviet counterforce attack on US ICBM silos would cause at least 1 million immediate deaths and up to 20 million within 30 days. ‘Quite optimistic assumptions’ were needed for estimates below 8 million. The American riposte against Soviet missiles was expected to produce between 4 and 28 million deaths. Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States The Effects of Nuclear Wa. (Croom Helm, 1980) pp. 10, 84, 86 and 91.Google Scholar
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    The Times. October 1980, passim.Google Scholar
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    Statement on the Defence Estimates 1980. vol. I, p. 39.Google Scholar
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    Article 1 commits the Parties ‘to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means’ and ‘to refrain … from the threat or use of force’. Article 6 obliges the Parties to regard an armed attack ‘on the Algerian Departments of France’ as ‘an attack against them all’, an obligation only cancelled on 3 July 1962.Google Scholar
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    Roy Fullick and Geoffrey Powell, Suez: The Double Wa. (Hamish Hamilton, 1979) pp. 36 and 50.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© James Cable 1983

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  • James Cable

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