Strategy for an Atomic Monopoly

  • Lawrence Freedman
Part of the Studies in International Security book series (SIS)


Americans were accustomed to viewing international politics, which up to 1940 was to all intents and purposes European politics, with a certain detachment. The European propensity to war was symptomatic of its dominance by reactionary and decadent elites and the persistence of imperialist instincts. Furthermore, there was little reason to view war as a grim struggle for survival, let alone a time for defiant resistance. The United States’ industrial and economic resources were so vast that there were few doubts that, once she put her mind to the task, any enemy would be eventually overwhelmed. The United States was the weary policeman, slow to be roused and loath to get involved in the internecine quarrels of European states. Once aware of danger and into action, she was unbeatable.


Clay Europe Petroleum Assure Expense 
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Copyright information

© The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1983

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  • Lawrence Freedman

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