Conclusions

Abstract

At 10.00 p.m. on 27 July a sullen silence fell over the front. After thirty-seven months the Korean War had ended. The opposing armies disengaged and fell back on their main defence lines behind the DMZ. The outposts in No Man’s Land were left ‘deserted and quiet except for the rats’.¹ There was little rejoicing. For the first time in its modern history, the US had failed to win. The war had ended in a draw. This was an uncomfortable outcome for Americans. The public was in a dark mood, inclined to compare the costs of the war with its inconclusive result: ‘There were no victory celebrations, no cheering crowds in Times Square, no sense of triumph’, only relief that a ‘sour little war’ was finally over.² Eisenhower had fulfilled his campaign pledge and considered the armistice his greatest achievement. He had brought a settlement which avoided either ‘appeasement’ or an escalation which would have risked global war and strained the US alliance system. The teŕms were the best which could be obtained and reflected his belief that ‘unlimited war in the nuclear age was unimaginable, and limited war unwinnable’.³ Others, however, remained unconvinced. Clark signed the armistice with ‘a heavy heart’.