Abstract
In Chapter 3 it was stated that it cannot be known that there is tacit understanding about spheres of influence, but that such understanding can be inferred from the actions of an influencing power and the action or inaction of its adversary. The acquiescence of one power in what another does admits the inference that there is tacit understanding as to what each expects of the other. With the purpose of determining what it is that implies tacit understanding about spheres of influence, the present chapter examines four examples of the actions of influencing powers and of the reaction of the adversary power in each case. Two examples are of Soviet actions in eastern Europe and two are of United States actions in Latin America: namely, the invasion of Hungary in 1956 and of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the naval blockade of Cuba during the missile crisis of 1962, and finally, the invasion of the Dominican Republic in 1965. Discussion of each of these occupies the first two parts and follows the pattern of presenting first, what the influencing power did, second, the justification it advanced, and third, what the adversary power did and said in response.
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Notes and References
For an account of events in Poland, see K. Syrop, Spring in October (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1957)
J.M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1962)
and G. Ionescu, The Break-up of the Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965).
For an account of the events in Hungary, see F.A. Vali, Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961).
For the Soviet view, see A. Belokon and V. Tolstikov, The Truth About Hungary (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957).
P.E. Zinner (ed.), National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe, A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary, February-November 1956 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957) pp. 435–40.
R.A. Remington, The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution (MIT Press, 1971) pp. 34 and 38.
D.D. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 (London: Heinemann, 1963) p. 88.
R.R. James (ed.), The Czechoslovak Crisis (London: Chatto, 1969) pp. 10–11.
For the text, see R.A. Remington, Winter in Prague (MIT Press, 1968) pp. 88–137.
On this point see T.W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe, 1945–1970 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1970) p. 373.
P. Windsor and A. Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968 (London: Chatto, 1969) p. 61.
A. Sovetov, ‘The present stage in the struggle between socialism and imperialism’, International Affairs, 11 (Moscow, Nov. 1968) p. 5. On the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine’, see also S. Sanakoyev, ‘Socialist foreign policy and the community of fraternal countries’; O. Pavlov, ‘Proletarian internationalism and defense of socialist gains
and K. Ivanov, ‘Lessons for the future’, International Affairs, 10 (Moscow, Oct. 1968).
See Peter Grose, New York Times, 22 July 1968, p. 7
and Benjamin Welles, New York Times, 26 July 1968, p. 12.
See, for instance, C.G. Burnham, ‘Czechoslovakia thirty years after Munich;, Yearbook of World Affairs, 1969, pp. 53–61.
John Newhouse, Cold Dawn, The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973) pp. 130–6 and 162.
See Keesings Contemporary Archives , 26 Oct. — 2 Nov. 1968; and D.W. Bowett, The Search for Peace (London: RKP, 1972) p. 119.
DSB, vol. XLVII, no. 1223 (3 Dec. 1962) pp. 831–2. On the decision to impose the quarantine, see R. Kennedy, 13 Days, The Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Pan, 1969) passim.
See G. Connell-Smith, The Inter-American System (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) pp. 255–9.
Bayliss Manning in J. Plank (ed.), Cuba and the United States (Washington, Brookings Institute, 1967) p. 230. Note: During the cirsis the Doctrine was not publicly mentioned by the administration. Kennedy rejected the idea of using it in Stevenson’s speech to the Security Council.
See Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Oxford University Press, 1974). This is discussed in the next chapter.
G.H. Quester, ‘Missiles in Cuba, 1970’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 49, no. 3 (April 1971) p. 493.
See also C. Gasteyger, ‘Political and strategic implications of Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean’, in J.D. Theberge (ed.), Soviet Seapower in the Caribbean: Political and Strategic Implications (New York, Praeger, 1972) pp. 59–71
and J.D. Theberge, The Soviet Presence in Latin America (New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1974) p. 69.
Y. Korovin, ‘International law through the Pentagon’s prism’, International Affairs (Moscow) (December 1962) pp. 5–7
and see also F.B. Schick, ‘Cuba and the rule of law’, International Affairs (Moscow) (Sept. 1963).
See R.W. Logan, Haiti and the Dominican Republic (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) pp. 70–82
and A.F. Lowenthal, ‘The United States and the Dominican Republic’, in K.N. Waltz and S.L. Spiegel, Conflict in World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1971) pp. 99–114.
Ibid., pp. 746–7. Note: The extent of communist influence and the likelihood of the revolt being taken over has been disputed by Senator Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power (London: Cape, 1967) pp. 88–9
Theodore Draper, The Dominican Revolt (New York: Commentry, 1968)
and F. Parkinson, ‘Santo Domingo and after’, Yearbook of World Affairs (1966), p. 145. Similarly R.W. Logan, op. cit., commented with respect to the Soviet Union, that even if communists took over, ‘it might have greatly preferred not to become involved with yet another sugar republic within the United States sphere of influence’; p. 79.
On the division within the OAS, see F. Parkinson, op. cit., pp. 152–4; and J. Slater, ‘The limits of legitimization in international organizations: the organization of American States and the Dominican crisis’, International Organization, 23 (Winter 1969) pp. 48–72.
Ibid., pp. 879–80. On the principle of non-intervention in relation to the Dominican Republic, see R.J. Vincent, Non-Intervention and International Order (Princeton, 1974) pp. 202–7.
B. Marushkin, ‘US policy and the national liberation movement’, International Affairs (Moscow) (Apr. 1966) p. 53.
V.I. Fyodorov, ‘The imperialist doctrine of intercepting revolution’, International Affairs (Moscow), 5 (May 1966) p. 67.
L. Kamynin, ‘International piracy doctrine’, International Affairs (Moscow), 6 (June 1965) pp. 15–16. See also ‘From the Monroe Doctrine to the Johnson Doctrine’, ibid (Moscow) 8 (Aug. 1965) pp. 105–7.
For a discussion of economic sanctions, see J. Galtung, ‘On the effects of international sanctions: with examples from the case of Rhodesia’, World Politics, vol. XIX, no. 3 (Apr. 1967) pp. 378–416
and M.P. Doxey, Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement (London: Oxford University Press, 1971).
On linkage, see M. Kalb and B. Kalb, Kissinger (New York: Dell, 1975) ch. 6, pp. 122–3.
T.M. Franck and E. Weisband, Word Politics, Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972) p. 8.
R. Aron, ‘The Meaning of Destiny’, in T. Aczel (ed.), Ten Years After (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966).
From the official State Department summary of Mr Sonnenfeldt’s remarks as published in the New York Times, 6 Apr. 1976, p. 14. See also David Binder, ibid., p. 1; Hella Pick, Guardian Weekly, 11 Apr. 1976, p. 9; and Jonathon Steele, loc. sit.
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© 1983 Paul Ernest Keal
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Keal, P. (1983). Action and Inaction. In: Unspoken Rules and Superpower Dominance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-06224-9_7
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