Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years Later: What has Changed?
The first, and perhaps the most important, question about nuclear weapons is whether, or to what degree, they are truly different from others. There was not much doubt on this point in July 1945 at Alamogordo, and the reactions of statesmen and soldiers to the first private reports of that event show that one did not have to be present to be impressed. It was Churchill who called it ‘the Second Coming in Wrath’ and MacArthur who said, ‘This will completely change all our ideas of warfare.’ We have even earlier evidence, from those who worked on Tube Alloys in Britain and on the ‘Manhattan’ Project in the United States, that the special character of the prospective bomb was a crucial element in their extraordinary performance. Going even further back, we meet the powerful mixture of fear, hope and intense concern with which the small world of those who understood its meaning reacted to the discovery of fission by Hahn and Strassman in 1938.
KeywordsNuclear Weapon Strategic Capability American Guarantee Military Target Deterrent Power
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