Laos, 1961–2

  • Gerald Segal


When the Laotian crises of 1961–2 are discussed by analysts of international relations, it is often only in terms of US-Soviet relations.1 The view that crisis management in 1961–2 was strictly an affair between Moscow and Washington was also that of the governments of the time and it will be argued here that this perspective is too narrow. It will be our objective here to point out the essential role of Peking in the 1961–2 crisis and highlight the trend toward tripolar politics. We will study those important events of early 1961, but also focus on the much neglected period of the Geneva conference on Laos and on the US-PRC crisis of May 1962. In the course of the analysis we will describe the genesis of tripolarity in the hope that by stressing the tripolar aspects, the Laotian crisis can be more comprehensively analysed and the events understood in a new light.


Crisis Management Offshore Island Taiwan Strait China Policy Soviet Policy 
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Notes and References

  1. 1.
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Copyright information

© Gerald Segal 1982

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerald Segal
    • 1
  1. 1.University of LeicesterUK

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