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Abstract

During the international depression of the 1930s, commentators south of the Pyrenees continued to assert that Spain, because of her relative economic backwardness together with the effects of a sustained drive towards autarky over the previous quarter of a century, remained virtually isolated from the worst consequences of the greatest crisis which the capitalist system had ever experienced.1 In a recent survey article two leading Spanish economic historians contend that The most serious problems facing the [Spanish] republic were not to come from coincidental external circumstances [but from] longer standing, basic internal problems such as agriculture… It is from here that originate most of the strains and stresses that were to explode in a bloody civil war’.2

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Notes and References

  1. See especially Servicio de Estudios del Banco de Espana, Ritmo de la crisis economica espanola en relacion con la mundial (Madrid: 1934) p. 354.

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  2. Josep Fontana and Jordi Nadal, ‘Spain, 1914–70’, in Carlo M. Cipolla (ed.), The Fontana Economic History of Europe, vol. 6, ii (London and Glasgow: 1976) pp. 485–86.

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  3. See Manuel-Jesus Gonzalez, ‘Neomercantilismo en Madrid: dos economistas de postguerra’, Informacion Comercial Espanola, 517 (1976), 125–43.

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  4. Pedro Schwartz, ‘Politics First: The Economy After Franco’, Government and Opposition, 11 (1976) p. 85.

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  5. On this period see Joan Clavera et al., Capitalismo espanol: de la autarquia a la estabilizacion, 1939–59, 2 vols (Madrid: 1973);

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  6. and Manuel-Jesus Gonzalez, La economica politica del Franquismo: 1940–70: dirigismo, mercado y planificacion (Madrid: 1979).

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  7. See Charles W. Anderson, The Political Economy of Modern Spain: Policy Making in an Authoritarian State (Wisconsin: 1970) pp. 130–1.

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  8. Juan Munoz et al., La internacionalizacion del capital en Espana, 1959–77 (Madrid: 1978) pp. 68, 124–30.

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  9. Banco de Bilbao, Renta nacional de Espana y su distribucion provincial, 1975 (Bilbao, 1977), pp. 34, 45.

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  10. On this transitional period see Stanley Meisler, ‘Spain’s New Democracy’, Foreign Affairs, 56 (1977–8), pp. 190–208.

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  11. See Jose Luis Garcia Delgado and Julio Segura, Reformismo y crisis economical la herencia de la dictadura (Madrid: 1977), pp. 89–132.

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  12. Michael Noelke and Robert Taylor, La industria espanola cara al Mercado Comun: el impacto de la adhesion, cited in El Pais (11 Jan. 1980).

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© 1982 Andrew Cox

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Harrison, J. (1982). Spain: the End of the Miracle. In: Cox, A. (eds) Politics, Policy and the European Recession. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05764-1_8

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