A Differential Game of Intra-CMEA Trade and Pricing.

  • Alfred Zauberman
Part of the Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies book series (VICES)


In selecting the approach and apparatus for our model of inter-CMEA trade and pricing, our preference is for those of a differential game. The question may then be validly asked: why specifically this type of game? In answer we would point to its two features relevant for the problem we are dealing with:


Nash Equilibrium Cooperative Game Differential Game Dynamic Game Nash Solution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© The Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alfred Zauberman
    • 1
  1. 1.The London School of EconomicsUK

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