Abstract
It is often maintained that arguments for the existence of God are not really of any significance for religious faith. If a person is untouched by religious feeling or the disposition to worship, or is not responsive to the claims of any religious revelation, it is said, argument will certainly not make him so. If he is, on the contrary, disposed to engage in the practices and related discourse constitutive of a religion, and thus to have a real relationship to the God (if any) of that religion, such arguments will be superfluous. One either plays some religious language-game, participates in some religious form of life, or one does not. Philosophical argument can have, or at least ought to have, no bearing on the matter either way; except to show that philosophical argument has no such bearing.1 Even if such arguments as purport to prove, or to render probable, the existence of some ‘transcendent Being’, or what have you, did succeed, they would only provide the metaphysician with an abstraction who had nothing to do with the God of the worshipper.
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Notes
Among the most interesting of many recent defenders of this view is D. Z. Phillips. Cf. The Concept of Prayer (London, 1965).
This standpoint is characteristic of Karl Barth. Cf. Church Dogmatics(Edinburgh, 1936–1964) 1, 2, 172f., 204, 232, etc.
This view has been popular among Protestant theologians since the publication of F. D. E. Schleiermacher’s On Religion(New York, 1958) in 1799.
For a nice summary of the difficulties, see A. G. N. Flew, ‘Death’, in A. G. N. Flew and A. C. MacIntyre (eds), New Essays in Philosophical Theology (London, 1955) 267–72.
For this paragraph, cf. H. A. Hodges, God Beyond Knowledge(London, 1979).
A. G. N. Flew, The Presumption of Atheism (London, 1976) 22.
C. Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time (New York, 1967) 32.
Cf. Bernard Lonergan, Philosophy of God, and Theology (London, 1973) 50–5.
Cf. Lonergan, A Second Collection (London, 1974) 28: ‘What is decisive is not the felt presence, but the rational judgment that follows upon an investigation of the felt presence.’
Austin Farrer, ‘The Christian Apologist’, in Jocelyn Gibb (ed.), Light on C. S. Lewis (London, 1965) 26.
David Hay, ‘More Rumours of Angels’, The Month, vol. vii, no. 12 (December 1974) 803.
J. Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (London, 1966) 45–52.
J. J. Shepherd, Experience, Inference and God (London, 1975) 2.
Don Cupitt, Jesus and the Gospel of God (Guildford and London, 1979) 92.
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© 1982 Hugo A. Meynell
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Meynell, H.A. (1982). On the Alleged Unimportance of Arguments for God’s Existence. In: The Intelligible Universe. New Studies in the Philosophy of Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05195-3_1
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