Abstract
Locke, no less than Hobbes, relied on a traditional fiction — the so-called state of nature — to define the grounds of political obligation. One reason for acceptance of this fiction may have been the argument that antiquity alone stood for truth and that it was therefore to be regarded as an ultimate authority.1 The opposing idea, also current in the seventeenth century, rested on the assumption that contemporary attainments were of a sufficiently mature and authoritative quality to consider truth the product of progress and hence the ‘daughter of time’.2 This belief (though it-self an oversimplification) represented a more adequate appreciation of the nature of the historical process, and neither Hobbes nor Locke failed to see its merits.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, in Locke’s Two Treatises of Government (ed. P. Laslett), Cambridge, amended 2nd ed., 1970, sect. 111, lines 1–5: ‘… The Golden Age … had more Virtue, and consequently better Governoiirs, as well as less vicious Subjects …’ All section, page, and line references to Locke’s text here are to Laslett’s edition of his Two Treatises, cited above.
An Early Draft of Locke’s Essay (Draft A), ed. R. I. Aaron and J. Gibb, Oxford, 1936, sect. 1, p. 5.
Sect. 12, lines 16–19. This assumption is the antithesis of legal positivism, according to which ‘it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality’ (H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford, 1961, p. 181).
See, e.g. sects. 57 and 87, lines 1–3. Also J. D. Mabbott, The State and the Citizen, London, 1948, p. 23, n. 1.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theol., IaIIae, q. 96, art. 5. See also Locke’s Essays on the Law of Nature, pp. 53 and 56, and his Two Tracts on Government, ed. P. Abrams, Cambridge, 1967, p. 219, notes 1 and 2.
For natural law forbidding drunkenness see Hobbes, ibid., p. 120. For a detailed discussion see D. j. O’Connor, Aquinas and Natural Law, London, 1967, ch. VII.
Bk. IV, ch. vii. I think Laslett’s interpretation of the phrase in The Second Treatise, sect. 11 (p. 292, note on lines 30–1) is mistaken, and H. Aarsleff’s explanation is the correct one (‘The State of Nature and the Nature of Man in Locke’, in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. J. W. Yolton, Cambridge, 1969, pp. 129 ff.). See also J. Barnes, ‘Mr. Locke’s Darling Notion’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 22, 1972, 196.
Essay, Bk. IV, ch. iii, sect. 18 (for a similar proposition see Essays on the Law of Nature, p. 212). For Locke the proposition is true in the natural as well as in the civil state, since his concept of the law of nature allows the word ‘in-justice’ to apply in the natural state, so that ‘property’ in that context, too, is meaningful, applying to what men may own ‘by nature’, Hobbes makes use of a similar proposition (Leviathan, ch. 15, p. 110), except that for him it applies only to the civil state. For the proposition in both Locke’s and Hobbes’s writings see M. Seliger, The Liberal Politics of John Locke, London, 1968, pp. 206–8.
Ibid., line 14. For difficulties in Locke’s argument concerning the part of a person see J. P. Day, ‘Locke on Property’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 16, 1966 (reprinted in Life, Liberty, and Property, Essays on Locke’s Political Ideas, ed. G. J. Schochet, Belmont, California, 1971). If viewed against the background of Locke’s theologico-ontological assumptions most of the points raised by Day would seem to lose their relevance.
The same applies to strictures made by John Plamenatz (Man and Society, London, 1963, vol. I, pp. 244–5).
Sect. 27. Marx follows Locke in his own ‘labour theory’ and his thoughts on ‘alienated labour’. For both Locke and Marx a man should be entitled to that which he has made, as this is part of himself. Yet since the product of his activity is only part of himself, and he may be ‘alienated’ from this product, a person can become alienated from himself. In Marx’s case it is difficult to see whether a man is alienated from himself because his product is something existing ‘apart’ from him, or whether the alienation is the result of this ‘part of him’ being owned by another person. In Locke’s case I cannot see (pace C. B. Macpherson, ‘The Social Bearing of Locke’s Political Theory’, Western Political Quarterly, 7, 1954, reprinted in Life, Liberty, and Property, pp. 70–3, also his The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Oxford, 1962, pp. 214 ff.) that he ever explains whether, though a man is free to alienate his capacity for work, such an alienation is either justifiable or unjustifiable.
Sect. 119, lines 13–22; sects. 120–1. See also An Essay concerning Toleration of 1667 (ed. H. R. Fox Bourne, The Life of John Locke, London, 1876, vol. I, p. 183).
That only a man’s own interest is involved here is a point made by Plamenatz (Man and Society, vol. I, pp. 243–4). The term ‘collectivist’ is employed by W. Kendall, ‘John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule’, Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, 26, no. 2, Urbana, Ill., USA, 1941, 70–2 and passim; see also J. W. Gough, John Locke’s Political Philosophy, chs. II and IV.
Laslett, p. 96 and note †; also p. 290, note on sect. 9, line 1. The suggestion that Locke thought the doctrine strange because it seemed novel to him originates with Leo Strauss (Natural Right and History, Chicago, 1953, p. 222).
According to H. Grotius, each individual has the right to punish offenders, though after the establishment of civil society it is judged reasonable to transfer this right to the state: De lure Belli ac Pacis, Paris, 1625, Bk. II, ch. 20, sects. 3 and 7; ch. 21, sect. 3. Also John Seiden, De Synedriis.… Veterum Ebraeorum, London, 1650 and 1653 (Opera Omnia, ed. D. Wilkins, London, 1726, vol. I, pp. 456–9).
For Locke’s argument see sect. 13, lines 15–29; also sects. 90, 137, and 225, lines 5–15. His most telling picture of what is implied in the nature of ‘absolute monarchy’ is in sect. 93. Laslett favours the view that Locke’s reference here is to Filmer rather than to Hobbes. Since Locke’s language in sects. 13 and 93 is similar to that employed in his Essays on the Law of Nature of 1664 (p. 118, lines 6–15, and the phrase pro libitu suo in lines 8 and 10, with its express reference to absolute political rule), when Patriarcha was as yet unpublished and his acquaintance with Filmer limited, I consider it at least as likely that his argument is directed against Hobbes. Laslett in his note on sect. 9, line 1 (op. cit., p. 290) admits as much. R. Polin (La Politique Morale de John Locke, Paris, 1960, p. 183) has Hobbes in mind here, and Seliger (op cit., pp. 101–3) both Hobbes and Filmer.
See, for instance, E. F. Carritt, The Theory of Morals, London, 1928 (revised ed., 1930, p. 110).
B. Bosanquet, Some Suggestions in Ethics, London, 1918 (enlarged reprint 1919), p. 195.
Also H. B. Acton (ed.), The Philosophy of Punishment, London, 1969, pp. 12–13. The reference in Bosanquet is to deterrence and reformation, not to deterrence and reparation.
Some such criticism can be found in T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, sects. 190–2, and 196 (Works, London, 1885–9, vol. II, pp. 496–7, 500–1).
That for Locke ‘natural’ is opposed to ‘civil’ or ‘political’ but not to ‘moral’, and that for him men’s natural powers are moral rights or powers can be understood by comparison with Edward Gee’s The Divine Right and Original of the Civil Magistrate (London, 1658, ch. 1). Gee argues that a natural power is distinct from a moral one in that the former (mere force) does not involve obligations. For if it did, there would be no such thing as moral power, and government would be simply by the strongest. On the other hand, moral power, though it challenges our obedience, ‘cannot compel to it’ (p. 22). For the fact that ‘natural’ and ‘moral’ were used as synonyms among seventeenth-century moralists see A. N. Prior, Logic and the Basis of Ethics, p. 26. See p. 5.
Sect. 19, lines 3–4; sect. 14, lines 9–10. For the controversial view that Locke’s natural state (like Hobbes’s) is a state of war see J. D. Mabbott, The State and the Citizen, pp. 20–1. For the opposite view see J. W. Yolton, ‘Locke on the Law of Nature’, The Philosophical Review, 67, 1958, 494–6. In his John Locke (London, 1973, ch. 15), Mabbott still adheres to his original thesis, but adds a number of qualifications.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1981 W. von Leyden
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
von Leyden, W. (1981). Natural and Political Power. In: Hobbes and Locke. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05060-4_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-05060-4_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-05062-8
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-05060-4
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)