Abstract
The cosmological argument of John Duns (1265–1308) of Scotland has been hailed as ‘a landmark in the history of the cosmological argument’, one that is much more significant than those of his predecessors1; indeed, the complexity and length of Scotus’s case for the existence of God make Aquinas’s proofs look like the summary arguments for theological novices that they purport to be.2 According to Allan B. Wolter, Scotus devoted more attention to developing a proof for God’s existence than any of the other great scholastics.3 He formulated only one basic argument, which he revised three times during the eight years in which he laboured on it. The proof chosen by Scotus for this intensive study was not the favourite of Aquinas, the proof from motion. According to Harris, Scotus attached ‘no weight’ to Thomas’s first way.4 F. C. Copleston explains that in Scotus’s eyes,
...the conception of God as first Mover was a very inadequate conception, as it does not pass beyond the physical world and attain the transcendent, infinite Being on which all finite beings essentially depend.5
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
R. L. Sturch, ‘The Cosmological Argument’ (Ph.D. thesis, Oxford University, 1970), p. 145.
See C. R. S. Harris, Duns Scotus $12 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927), 1: 267.
Allan B. Wolter, ‘Duns Scotus and the Existence and Nature of God’, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 28 (1954): 94–5.
For a history of the development of Scotus’s proof, see Camille Bérubé, ‘Pour une histoire des preuves de l’existence de Dieu chez Duns Scot’, in Deus et Homo ad Mentum I. Duns Scoti: Acta Tertii Congressus Internationalis Vindobonac 28 Sept.-2 Oct. 1970 (Rome: Societas Internationalis Scotistica, 1972).
Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy vol. 2: Mediaeval Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus (London: Burns Oates & Washbourne, 1950), p. 483. Cf. pp. 520–1.
See Allan Bernard Wolter, The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1946), pp. 130–1;
Roy Efller, ‘Duns Scotus and the Physical Approach to God’, in Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 3: John Duns Scotus, 1265–1965, ed. John K. Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1965), pp. 171–90.
John Duns Scotus, Opus oxoniense, I, dist. II, q.i., in Philosophical Writings, ed. and trans. Allan Wolter (London: Nelson, 1962), p. 35.
Harris, Scotus 2: 176. Cf. Joseph Owens, ‘Up to What Point is God Included in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus?’, Mediaeval Studies 10 (1948): 163–77.
See F. C. Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy (London: Methuen & Co., 1972), p. 219.
See Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London: Sheed & Ward, 1955), pp. 456–7.
Allan Wolter, ‘Duns Scotus on the Nature of Man’s Knowledge of God’, Review of Metaphysics 1 (1947): 7.
William L Rowe, The Cosmological Argument (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 49–50.
Scotus, De primo principio 3.2. Our interpretation is confirmed by Étienne Gilson, ‘L’existence de Dieu selon Duns Scot’, Mediaeval Studies 11 (1949): 34.
The contents of this article are duplicated in Etienne Gilson, Jean Duns Scot (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1952), pp. 116–77.
See Allan B. Wolter, ‘The Formal Distinction’, in Scotus ed. Ryan and Bonansea, pp. 45–6. See also A. J. O’Brien, ‘Scotus on Essence and Existence’, New Scholasticism 38 (1964): 61–77.
As M. J. Grajewski points out, although Scotus did hold that God is the only being in whom essence and existence are identical, the major application of the formal distinction in matters of theodicy was not to the problem of proving divine existence, but of reconciling the simplicity of God’s essence with the multiplicity of persons within the Trinity and the plurality of divine attributes (Maurice J. Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus [Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1944], pp. 180–97).
See also Béraud de Saint-Maurice, John Duns Scotus: a Teacher for our Times, trans. Columban Duffy (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1965), pp. 188–200.
Scotus, Opus p. 39. The scholastics, following Aristotle, claimed that the conclusion of a syllogism could be no stronger than its weakest premiss, and, hence, all premisses of a demonstrative syllogism must be necessary (Allan B. Wolter, Introduction to A Treatise on God as First Principle by John Duns Scotus, trans. Allan B. Wolter [Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press; Forum Books, 1966], p. xvii; cf. Wolter, ‘Nature and Existence’, pp. 101–5).
Julius R. Weinberg, A Short History of Medieval Philosophy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 220.
Etienne Gilson, gen. ed., A History of Philosophy 4 vols. (New York: Random House, 1962), vol. 2: Medieval Philosophy by Armand A. Maurer, p. 223.
Efrem Bettoni, Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of His Philosophy, trans. and ed. Bernardine Bonansea (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1961), pp. 137–8.
Copyright information
© 1980 William Lane Craig
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Craig, W.L. (1980). John Duns Scotus. In: The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz. Library of Philosophy and Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04993-6_6
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04993-6_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-04995-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-04993-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)