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Abstract

In this chapter we will concentrate on the SWR in Hungary since the economic reform of 1968. Up to 1968 Hungary relied on the SWR introduced in 1957, under which the centre assigned binding rates of wage increases to enterprises through the hierarchical channels of management. These averages were not allowed to be increased even if enterprises over-fulfilled the plan targets in productivity.1 It was argued that there was no way to measure productivity adequately on the enterprise level. The real reason for this measure, however, was the determination of the authorities to hold down wage increases. Due to the political events of 1956 the control over wages got out of hand and nominal wages increased dramatically in 1956–7.

Keywords

Wage Differential Average Wage Wage Increase Wage Growth Wage Earner 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    I. Buda, Közgazdasági Szemle, no. 4, 1965Google Scholar
  2. and T. Meitner, Közgazdasági Szemle, no. 2, 1958.Google Scholar
  3. 9.
    In order to placate the workers a shift was made to less overt preferential treatment of top managers in the distribution of bonuses. Instead of the single bonus, top managers were given a year-end reward and a profit premium (as a compensation for the smaller year-end reward), both financed from the sharing fund. The former was set in proportion to basic salaries and years of service, and the latter depended on the ratio of the gross sharing fund (before payments for wage increases and taxes were made) to the wage-bill. (See P. Bánki, Közgazdasági Szemle, no. 2, 1973). The gross sharing fund was selected in order not to create conflicting interests between managers and workers. If bonuses of managers had depended on the net sharing fund, managers would have been interested in minimal wage increases. Somewhere along the way the earnings of managers were supplemented by a supplementary profit premium financed from the wage-bill. (The present situation is described in Chapter 4.)Google Scholar
  4. 14.
    A. Kemény, Práce a mzda, no. 3, 1971Google Scholar
  5. and L. Pongrácz, Társadalmi Szemle, no. 4, 1973.Google Scholar
  6. 16.
    See P. Bánki, Munkaügyi Szemle, no. 4, 1971, and B. Balassa, 1973, pp. 352–3.Google Scholar
  7. 19.
    J. Bokor, Pénzügyi Szemle, no. 12, 1973.Google Scholar
  8. 20.
    See also P. Bánki, Munkaügyi Szemle, no. 4, 1971.Google Scholar
  9. 22.
    For more, see J. Adam, Revue d’études comparatives est-ouest, vol. 8, no. 2, 1977.Google Scholar
  10. 23.
    See the interview with the minister of labour, Müszaki Elet, 7 June 1974, and also P. Bánki, Ipargazdaság, no. 1, 1974.Google Scholar
  11. 28.
    I. Kertész, Közgazdasági Szemle, no. 9, 1977.Google Scholar
  12. 30.
    See F. Kölgyesi and A. Timár, Pénzügyi Szemle, no. 11, 1974.Google Scholar
  13. 32.
    See also G. László and J. Veress, Pénzügyi Szemle, no. 3, 1978.Google Scholar
  14. 33.
    O. Gadó, 1976, pp. 54–5 and A. Timár, Munkaügyi Szemle, no. 12, 1975.Google Scholar
  15. 35.
    A. Timár, Munkaügyi Szemle, nos. 1–2, 1978.Google Scholar
  16. 36.
    T. Sawczuk (Gospodarka planowa, no. 3, 1977) maintains that in 1976, 60 % of enterprises applied this system.Google Scholar
  17. 37.
    For more, see Announcement no. 14, 1975, in A gazdasági …, pp. 67–9, also A. Timár, Munkaügyi Szemle, no. 12, 1975 and O. Gadó, 1976, p. 54.Google Scholar
  18. 38.
    A. Timár, Munkaügyi Szemle, no. 12, 1975Google Scholar
  19. and G. Rák and A. Timár, Munkaügyi Szemle, no. 1, 1974.Google Scholar
  20. 44.
    See also L. Pongrácz, Társadalmi Szemle, no. 4, 1973.Google Scholar
  21. 45.
    A. Timár, Munkaügyi Szemle, nos. 1–2, 1978.Google Scholar
  22. 47.
    A. Timár, Munkaügyi Szemle, no. 12, 1975. Profit is here defined in the same way as in the indicator of gross income per employee.Google Scholar
  23. 53.
    A. Timár, Munkaügyi Szemle, no. 12, 1975.Google Scholar
  24. 54.
    Sz. Csaba, Közgardasági Szemle, no. 3, 1977.Google Scholar
  25. 55.
    I. Kertész, Közgazdasági Szemle, no. 9, 1977Google Scholar
  26. and L. Nyikos, Közgazdasági Szemle, no. 9, 1977.Google Scholar
  27. 56.
    L. Kónya, Pénzügyi Szemle, no. 2, 1978.Google Scholar
  28. 57.
    A. Timár, Munkaügyi Szemle, nos. 1–2, 1978.Google Scholar
  29. 58.
    L. Kónya, Pénzügyi Szemle, no. 2, 1978.Google Scholar
  30. 60.
    A. Timár, Munkaügyi Szemle, nos. 1–2, 1978.Google Scholar
  31. 61.
    See L. Nyikos, Közgazdasági Szemle, no. 9, 1977.Google Scholar
  32. 66.
    A. Timâr, Munkaügyi Szemle, nos. 1–2, 1978Google Scholar
  33. and L. Kónya, Pénzügyi Szemle, no. 2, 1978. J. Lökkös does not agree with such an evaluation. To him wage-bill regulation was the important factor for a better economy of labour.Google Scholar
  34. 68.
    A. Timár, Munkaügyi Szemle, nos. 1–2, 1978. This happened in enterprises which employ 15% of the labour force.Google Scholar

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© Jan Adam 1979

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  • Jan Adam

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