Abstract
Among the countries examined, Poland has been most frequently plagued by inflation. It therefore deserves special attention. It is also the only country which did not take part in the wave of reforms in the second half of the 1960s. However, it did make all the preparations for a reform which was supposed to go into effect in January 1971 but which was abandoned due to the unrest which broke out in December 1970. In 1973 Poland finally embarked on a reform which included a new SWR. This chapter will concentrate on the present SWR which came into being as a result of the reform. However, for the reasons mentioned above we will first discuss the Polish system in the 1960s. This will also shed some light on problems which could not be dealt with in other chapters.
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Notes
B. Blass, Gospodarka planowa, no. 3, 1965.
B. Fick, Zycie gospodarcze, no. 1, 1964.
B. Blass, Gospodarka planowa, no. 2, 1964.
See J. P. Farrell, April 1975; B. Fick, Zycie gospodarcze, no. 1, 1964. 7. The factory fund was small in relation to the planned wage-bill (in 1963 it amounted in industry to 6.4%; see B. Fick, 1967, p. 210), and the changes in it due to a change in financial performance were too small to be an incentive to economise on the wage-bill.
In the coal, metallurgical and food industries and also in some associations of light industry the automatic system was retained. See B. Fick, Życie gospodarcze, no. 1, 1964.
See B. Fick, Życie gospodarcze, no. 2, 1965.
See H. Weber, Życie gospodarcze, no. 32, 1964.
These new associations will gradually replace the old associations. In contrast to the old associations which have predominantly administrative functions, the new associations have economic functions and their performance is based on the principle of ‘khozraschet’. The new associations are directly subordinated to the ministries, and all the assignments resulting from the plan and the principles of the new reform are addressed by the ministries to the associations as a whole. This enables associations to set goals for individual enterprises in a differentiated way. The relation between the new associations and the enterprises integrated in them is not solved uniformly; the relation depends on the type of association. Generally it is possible to state that decisions on development and foreign relations are centralised. The same is true of decisions on drawing in-vestment credit; yet its repayment is left to enterprises. In all types of associations enterprises are autonomous financial units; in a few associations, however, they do not have the position of an independent judiciary unit. For more, see S. Jakubovicz, Gospodarka planowa, no. 8, 1973.
Z. Fedorowicz, 1977, p. 111; A. Topinski, in Zarys systemu … , 1975, pp. 130–2.
See A. Topinski, in Zarys sytemu … , 1975, p. 121.
See Interview with H. Slawecki, Życie gospodarcze, no. 50, 1973
and E. Nedzowski, Życie gospodarcze, no. 46, 1973.
E. Cichowski, Finanse, no. 8, 1973.
A. Wolowczyk, Finanse, no. 5, 1973.
To avoid such an expansion of employment, the central authorities also tried to control growth of employment. True, in 1964 the assignment of the number of employed to enterprises was formally abolished. In practice, however, this measure had little effect, partly due to the retention of the directive assignment of wage-bills. See J. Obodowski, Życie gospo-darcze, no. 11, 1972.
Some economists suggested designing the reform so as to create conditions for a new model of high wages combined with an optimal employment. See, e.g., M. Kabai, Życie gospodarcze, no. 19, 1974.
U. Wojciechowska, Życie gospodarcze, no. 27, 1973.
This also refers to piece-work which many economists would like to see substantially limited or gradually terminated. See, e.g., K. Klocek, Życie gospodarcze, no. 33, 1972.
Some of the reasons for choosing output added instead of profit were mentioned in Chapter 5. It seems that one of the main reasons was the concern that profit might cause a conflict of interests between management and the other personnel of enterprises. And this is also the reason why a special bonus fund for managerial staff (which is linked to net profit) was introduced. See A. Topinski, in Zarys systemu …, 1975, p. 144.
K. Opalinski and I. Zamojska, Bank i kredyt, no. 4, 1973.
A. Topinski, in Zarys sytemu …, p. 121; K. Golinovski, Gospodarka planowa, no. 9, 1977.
See, for example, M. Mieszczankowski, Życie gospodarcze, no. 17, 1974, and no. 23, 1974.
See S. Jędrychowski, Finanse, no. 4, 1973.
See, e.g., A. Zawislak, Gospodarka planowa, no. 8, 1973.
A. Topinski, in Zarys systemu … , 1975, pp. 129–30
and K. Golinowski, Gospodarka planowa, no. 9, 1977.
A. Topinski, in Zarys systemu …, 1975, p. 121.
B. Holubicki, Gospodarka planowa, no. 6, 1977
B. Holubicki, Gospodarka planowa, no. 9, 1977; and B. Glinski, 1977, pp. 40–1.
See T. Wrzaszczyk, Gospodarka planowa, nos. 7–8, 1977.
It is applied in the following branches: machine, chemical, light and agricultural machinery. See T. Wrzaszczyk, Gospodarka planowa, nos. 7–8, 1977.
K. Golinowski, Gospodarka planowa, no. 9, 1977.
For more on the modified system see T. Wrzaszczyk, Gospodarka planowa, nos. 7–8, 1977, and also Życie gospodarcze, no. 21, 1977
and K. Golinowski, Gospodarka planowa, no. 9, 1977.
K. Golinowski, Gospodarka planowa, no. 9, 1977 and Życie gospodarcze, no. 21, 1977.
K. Golinowski, Gospodarka planowa, no. 9, 1977.
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© 1979 Jan Adam
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Adam, J. (1979). Regulation of Wages in Poland. In: Wage Control and Inflation in the Soviet Bloc Countries. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04892-2_8
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