Abstract
Up to 1958 Czechoslovakia applied the classical Soviet SWR apart from a departure from the Soviet practice in one respect. In 1956 it introduced a change in the relationship between the over-fulfilment of output targets and the growth of the wage-bill. Until then, the wage-bill of enterprises could increase proportionally to the rate of over-fulfilment of the gross value of output target. This arrangement was—as already noted—prone to inflation. When in 1956 the planned global wage fund was overdrawn, the government decided to impose a more rigorous control; one of the most important measures was to introduce adjustment coefficients lower than unity for the over-fulfilment of plans.1
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Ibid., pp. 40–6, and M. Sokol, Plánované hospodářstvi, no. 11. 1959.
See Z. Vergner, Plánované hospodářstvi no. 3 1957.
M. Sokol, Plánované hospodářstvi, no. 11, 1959.
The expectations that enterprises might strive for an over-fulfilment of the productivity target (since this was rewarded by a higher normative) did not materialise. On the other hand, the target for industrial output was over-fulfilled by 4.4% due to increased employment. It turned out that enterprises preferred over-fulfilment of output over productivity, which is more difficult to achieve, and in addition reduces the wage-bill. For more see M. Sokol, Plánované hospodářstvi, no. 11, 1961.
All groups in an enterprise work-force cannot be equally responsible for economic returns. The responsiblity must be differentiated according to the relative importance and influence of different functional groups in the hierarchical structure of management. No doubt, managers must bear greater responsibility than blue-collar workers. Therefore the former must participate to a greater extent in both good and bad results. 8. See also M. Horálek, Politicka ekonomie, no. 4, 1965.
See Z. Kodet, Politická ekonomie, no. 4, 1965. The tax on profit in industry amounted to 32%.
M. Sokol, Plánované hospodářstvi, nos. 8–9, 1966.
For more, see J. Adam, in Jahrbuch der Wirtschaft Osteuropas, vol. 3, 1972. The aim of the differentiation of tax rates was to hamper expansion of employment in branches with excessive manpower and thus to give sectors short of labour a greater share in the net addition to the labour force.
Z. Kutálek, Plánované hospodářstvi, nos. 8–9, 1966, and Zásady urychlené realizace nové soustavy řizeni, 1966.
J. Typolt, Plánocané hospodářstvi, no. 2, 1968.
A. Kudrna, Práce a mzda, no. 10, 1968.
See also M. Dabrowski, Gospodarka planowa, no. 2, 1977.
See also E. Moravec, Práce a mzda, no. 3, 1974.
J. Hejkal, Politická ekonomie, no. 9, 1974.
See Supplement to Hospodářské noviny, no. 50, 1975, and T. Hauptvogel, Práce a mzda, no. 6, 1976.
T. Hauptvogel, Práce a mzda, no. 7, 1974.
L. Lér, Plánované hospodářstvi, no. 1, 1978, and also Hospodářské noviny, no. 2, 1978.
Ibid. and also S. Šourek, Finance a úvěr, no. 3, 1978.
See, e.g., E. Moravec, Práce a mzda, no. 31, 1974
J. Dvořák, Politická ekonomie, no. 4, 1977
I. Cima, Plánované hospodářstvi, no. 5, 1976.
See S. Šourek, Finance a úvěr, no. 3, 1978. Šourek’s views seem to differ from the Government views as to the purpose of the new bonus fund.
Copyright information
© 1979 Jan Adam
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Adam, J. (1979). Wage Regulation in Czechoslovakia. In: Wage Control and Inflation in the Soviet Bloc Countries. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04892-2_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04892-2_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-04894-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-04892-2
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)