Abstract
I suppose that every beginner in philosophy is attracted to the representative theory of perception. Certainly I was. However, John Anderson, my teacher at Sydney University, held a direct realist theory. He quickly convinced me of the general plausibility of his position, but I saw, or thought I saw, considerable difficulties of detail. One of the first philosophical tasks which I set myself was to work out a detailed defence of direct realism.
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Notes
A. J. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973) ch. 5, section D.
See Wilfrid Sellars, ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, repr. in his Science, Perception and Reality ( London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963 ) p. 194.
As argued by G. E. M. Anscombe,‘The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature’, in Analytical Philosophy, 2nd ser., ed. R. J. Butler (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965 ).
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© 1979 Graham Macdonald, Michael Dummett, P. F. Strawson, David Pears, D. M. Armstrong, Charles Taylor, J. L. Mackie, David Wiggins, John Foster, Richard Wollheim, Peter Unger, Bernard Williams, Stephan Körner and A. J. Ayer
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Armstrong, D.M. (1979). Perception, Sense Data and Causality. In: Macdonald, G.F. (eds) Perception and Identity. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04862-5_4
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