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A Comparison between Ayer’s Views about the Privileges of Sense-Datum Statements and the Views of Russell and Austin

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Perception and Identity
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Abstract

Russell and Ayer have both written extensively about the nature and privileges of sense-datum statements. Austin too dealt with their privileges, but his main concern was with the question of whether there is any basic class of empirical statements. A good way of approaching the question of the privileges of sense-datum statements is to compare the views of the three philosophers. This will help to isolate some of the problems and it may suggest promising ways of solving them.

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Notes

  1. Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind ( London; Allen and Unwin, 1921 ) pp. 141–2.

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  2. Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy ( London: Oxford University Press, 1912 ) p. 47.

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  3. Bertrand Russell, ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance, Knowledge by Description’, in Mysticism and Logic, 2nd edn ( London: Allen and Unwin, 1917 ) p. 215.

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  4. J. L. Austin, ‘Other Minds’, in Philosophical Papers, ed. J. O. Urmson and G. Warnock, 2nd edn ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970 ) p. 65.

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  5. Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica (Cambridge: Cambridge U. P., 1910) vol. 1, p. 43.

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  6. Bertrand Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth ( London: Allen and Unwin, 1940 ) p. 137.

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  7. Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge, its Scope and Limits ( London: Allen and Unwin, 1948 ) p. 133.

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  8. A. J. Ayer, Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage ( Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971 ) pp. 108–9.

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  9. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic 1st edn (London: Gollancz, 1936) ch. 5. In the 2nd edn (London: Gollancz, 1946) this passage is on p. 91.

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  10. A. J. Ayer, ‘Basic Propositions’, in Problems of Analysis, ed. Max Black (London: Routledge, 1954); repr. in A. J. Ayer, Philosophical Essays ( London: Macmillan, 1954 ).

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  11. A. J. Ayer, ‘Has Austin Refuted Sense-data?’, in Symposium on J. L. Austin, ed. K. T. Fann ( London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969 ) p. 305.

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  12. A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge ( Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956 ) p. 65.

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  13. Austin, in Philosophical Papers, ed. Urmson and Warnock, pp. 60–1. Cf. J. L. Austin, Sense and Sensibilia ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962 ) pp. 42–3.

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G. F. Macdonald

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© 1979 Graham Macdonald, Michael Dummett, P. F. Strawson, David Pears, D. M. Armstrong, Charles Taylor, J. L. Mackie, David Wiggins, John Foster, Richard Wollheim, Peter Unger, Bernard Williams, Stephan Körner and A. J. Ayer

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Pears, D. (1979). A Comparison between Ayer’s Views about the Privileges of Sense-Datum Statements and the Views of Russell and Austin. In: Macdonald, G.F. (eds) Perception and Identity. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04862-5_3

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