‘Surprise is one of the most important principles of military art…. Experience shows that an aggressor, having achieved [strategic] surprise with his attack and exploiting the power of his previously deployed armed forces, has achieved tremendous results at the start of a war.’
Lieutenant General M. M. Kir’yan, ‘Vnezapnost’, in SVE, vol. 2
‘The decisive factor in securing for Germany [her astounding victories in the Second World War] was the first surprise blow, into which was put the whole weight of those ground and air forces which had been detailed for this operation and previously concentrated and deployed in the appropriate positions. … Simultaneously the enemy was hit over the whole depth of his operational deployment.… The [Nazi] tank formations usually raced ahead into the rear areas, in order to seize militarily important terrain before the Soviet reinforcements, coming up from the deep rear, could get there. This speedy advance by the Nazi tanks into the deep rear of the Soviet defence allowed the Germans to deal heavy blows at the Soviet reinforcements as they were coming up, to cross important water obstacles from the march, and to seize communications centres and other vital strategic installations. … Mastery of the air was essential.
General S. P. Ivanov, Nachal’nyi Period Voiny
‘[Today] not even the wealthiest country can afford to keep the whole of its armed forces deployed in peacetime. The only solution is to keep deployed in peacetime sufficient armed forces to reach at least the nearest strategic objectives before successive echelons are mobilised and sent into action. … it would seem advisable to possess in peacetime armed forces of the right size and type, so that the main aims of the war can be attained in the initial period without additional mobilisation. … He who, right from the start, can get his troops the deepest into enemy territory will be best able to exploit the results of his own nuclear strikes and to prevent the enemy from mobilising. This will be of great importance in Europe because the distances are so small.’
Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky, Voennaya Strategiya, 3rd Russian edition
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© 1983 P. H. Vigor
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Vigor, P.H. (1983). Epilogue Key quotations from senior Soviet officers. In: Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04814-4_15
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