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Sophistry and Scepticism

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Morality and the Inner Life

Abstract

In contrast with Socrates many of the sophists of his day were largely interested in getting on. To this end they were prepared to attempt influencing people’s beliefs and conduct regardless of considerations of truth and morality. This tended to undermine their pupil’s regard for argument, for truth and moral considerations. They taught their pupils to argue with equal success on both sides of a question, to bolster up the weaker argument so that it appeared stronger, to praise and blame the same thing. They could thus commend or condemn, argue this way or that, as it suited them. Argument was subordinated to advantage and desire, weakening the recognition that in these matters there is a truth which is independent of the self. Thus Socrates had to emphasise that one argument is not as good as another, that there are independent standards in logic for judging the soundness of an argument.

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Notes

  1. Remember Wittgenstein: ‘If you want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put’ (1969) section 343.

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© 1979 İlham Dilman

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Dilman, İ. (1979). Sophistry and Scepticism. In: Morality and the Inner Life. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04797-0_2

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