The Strategic Background

Abstract

If a credible analysis of the significance of the sea and of maritime forces in Soviet strategy must begin in the realms of her internal political structure and foreign policy, it must continue with an examination of Russia’s overall strategy and an acceptance that hitherto it has been predominantly land-based. Geography, history, as well as perceptions of contemporary threats, all point to this conclusion. It is true that current Soviet strategic writing admits that the advent of nuclear weapons has transformed the nature of war and that the Strategic Rocket Forces have now displaced the Ground Forces as the chief determinants of victory, but the basic concepts are still land-orientated. The main stress is on general nuclear war, beginning with heavy nuclear strikes against the enemy’s armed forces and economic centres, and immediately followed up and exploited by highly mobile mass armies and their associated air power. On the defensive side, the Soviet homeland must be protected by the Air Defence Forces and damage further limited by extensive civil defence measures covering the population and essential industries.¹ In the light of this emphasis, if maritime forces are to have a significant role in Soviet strategy and gain an adequate share of resources, their advocates must convince the political leadership that they have a unique contribution, which cannot be made by land forces, to the central aims of strategic planning; the prevention of nuclear or conventional attack on Soviet territory, or, if deterrence fails, the country’s ability to fight and win a nuclear war.