Skip to main content

Problems of Interpretation

  • Chapter
  • 11 Accesses

Abstract

There is no disputing that the Soviet Union is now one of the world’s leading sea powers. The emergence of its Navy from relative obscurity to a position where it can pose a credible challenge to the US Navy for mastery of the oceans has been one of the most remarkable features of the post-war period. But, though there has been general agreement that this phenomenon has actually taken place, there remains nonetheless considerable dispute about what it all means. Experts are divided about what the Soviet Navy is for, about its roles and priorities and about how effective it is. They do not agree about what the rise of the Soviet Navy tells us about Soviet policy in general. Since they also assess the level of threat posed by the Soviet Navy quite differently, they often make quite different recommendations as to how the West should react to it. Even though the Soviet Navy is very evidently a new element on the world scene which must be properly understood for the sake of general security, and responded to appropriately, it nevertheless so far remains something of a puzzle. To a large extent the nature of the evidence explains why it is so difficult to arrive at a consensus about the strengths and purposes of the Soviet Navy.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Buying options

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Chapter 1: Problems of Interpretation

  1. M. MccGwire, ‘The Turning Points in Soviet Naval Policy’ in MccGwire (1973a) p. 176.

    Google Scholar 

  2. C. R. Thorpe, ‘Mission Priorities of the Soviet Navy’ in Murphy (1978) pp. 159–61.

    Google Scholar 

  3. See, for instance, G. Till, ‘Perceptions of Naval Power Between the Wars’ in Towle (1982) pp. 172–93.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Col. P. Sidorov in the Soviet Military Review, no. 9, 1972, quoted by G. Jukes in MccGwire et al. (1975) p. 481.

    Google Scholar 

  5. General Staff Academy, Dictionary of Basic Military Terms (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965) quoted by M. P. Gallagher in MccGwire et al. (1975) pp. 56–7.

    Google Scholar 

  6. N. Friedman, US vs Soviet Style in Fleet Design in Murphy (1978) p. 209.

    Google Scholar 

  7. G. Barrat, Russia in Pacific Waters 1715–1825 ( Vancouver and London: University of British Columbia Press, 1981 ).

    Google Scholar 

  8. Adm. Sir Herbert Richmond, Sea Power in the Modern World (London: Bell, 1934) pp. 17ff.

    Google Scholar 

  9. M. MccGwire, Soviet Naval Programmes in Murphy (1978) p. 100.

    Google Scholar 

  10. M. MccGwire, The Soviet Navy in the Seventies in MccGwire and McDonnell (1977) p. 652.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Copyright information

© 1983 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Ranft, B., Till, G. (1983). Problems of Interpretation. In: The Sea in Soviet Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04564-8_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics