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Introduction

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Abstract

The form of competition policy which concerns us in this study is that which has been operated under the 1956 Restrictive Trade Practices Act (and subsequent amending legislation). This set up the Restrictive Practices Court and required the registration of restrictive agreements. Firms who were parties to these agreements either defended them in the Court against the presumption that they were contrary to the public interest, or abandoned them. Abandonment might be complete; but frequently the firms simply removed the restrictive sections of the agreements, a procedure known as ‘filleting’. We were not, except peripherally where its work overlapped with that of the Court, and those serving it, concerned with the effects of the work of the Monopolies Commission.1

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Chapter 1

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© 1979 D. P. O’Brien, W. S. Howe and D. M. Wright with R. J. O’Brien

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O’Brien, D.P., Howe, W.S., Wright, D.M., O’Brien, R.J. (1979). Introduction. In: Competition Policy, Profitability and Growth. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04483-2_1

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