A Party of a New Type

Abstract

The ad hoc alliance between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America did not long survive victory over fascist Germany. France, added after the Potsdam Conference, quarrelled with the UK and the USA as well as with the USSR. The Soviet Union, mindful of the Allied intervention of 1918–20, was distrustful of Western intentions. Germany was unfortunate in that she found herself at the centre of most disputes. This resulted from the fact that Germany was considered to be of crucial importance by both East and West. Compromises could be reached in Austria, even a Soviet withdrawal could be contemplated; but never in Germany. Could not some agreement have been reached to defuse the fear of a revanchist, resurgent Germany ravenously attacking her erstwhile conquerors? Why could the solution for Austria, a neutral, demilitarised republic, not apply to her sister state in the north? This option was never real. Germany was too large, too industrious, too inventive and harboured too much resentment towards her conquerors for them to return home satisfied that the ‘German problem’ had been solved. Nature abhors a vacuum, so the saying goes; such a power vacuum in central Europe would have been filled by either the USSR or the USA. Neither Great Power was willing to take the risk. A resurgent Germany, playing off East against West, might provoke another catastrophe. Germans could justifiably resent the feeling, in East and West, that if neither side could consistently influence German policy in its favour, then a divided Germany was the lesser of two evils.