Reaction to Sanctions

Abstract

The most economical use of sanctions would be the case where the threat was sufficient to induce the target to alter its policy and comply with the demands of the sanctionists; once sanctions are imposed, speedy compliance would minimize cost and dislocation. But in all cases of sanctioning examined in this study, the response of the target state has been negative; there has been rejection of the authority of the sanctioning group and a determined effort to resist, circumvent and overcome the effects of economic deprivation. Successful defiance of sanctions may vindicate this stand; it may also produce durable, and possibly beneficial changes in the structure of the target’s economy, alter international economic relationships and establish new patterns of trading, and boost the cost of sanctions beyond the level expected by or acceptable to the sanctioning group. The fact that a sanctioning venture which appeared excessively costly to sanctionists would probably not be attempted in the first place does not make this point academic. There may well be a misperception of the defensive and counter-offensive strengths of the target, leading to miscalculation of the ease with which its policies can be externally influenced.