Abstract
In 1975 Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger noted the inability of either side in the foreseeable future to acquire the means for either a disarming first strike or effective damage limitation, because of the demise of ABM systems confirmed by the 1972 SALT Treaty. ‘In these circumstances’, he continued, ‘one may ask, has nuclear strategy not reached a dead end?’ He answered that this might well be the case ‘as far as the massive attacks that preoccupied us in the 1960s’, but went on to claim that ‘unfortunately’, there remained ‘a number of more limited contingencies that could arise and that we should be prepared to deter’.1
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, Annual Defense Report FY 1976 (5 February 1975), pp. II-3-II-4.
Laurence Martin, ‘The utility of military force’, in Francois Duchêne (ed.), Force in Modern Societies: Its Place in International Politics (London: IISS, 1973), p. 16.
For an early discussion of the issue, see Klaus Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
J. I. Coffey, Strategic Power and National Security (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971).
McGeorge Bundy, ‘To cap the volcano’, Foreign Affairs XLVIII:1 (October 1969), pp. 9–10. (Emphasis in original.)
See Walter Slocombe, The Political Implications of Strategic Parity (London: IISS, 1971)
Appendix n; Benjamin Lambeth, ‘Deterrence in the MIRV era’, World Politics (January 1972), pp. 230–3.
Edward N. Luttwak, ‘The missing dimension of US defense policy: force, perceptions and power’, in Donald C. Daniel (ed.), International Perceptions of the Superpower Military Balance (New York: Praeger, 1978), pp. 21–3.
Henry Kissinger, Press Conference of 3 July 1974, reprinted in Survival, xvI:5 (September/October 1974).
Quoted in John Vincent, Military Power and Political Influence: The Soviet Union and Western Europe (London: IISS, 1975), p. 15.
See Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976);
Irving Janis, Victims of Group-Think (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972).
John Steinbruner, ‘Beyond rational deterrence: The Struggle for New Conceptions’, World Politics xxviii:2 (January 1976), p. 237.
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979 (Washington, DC: 2 February 1978), p. 5.
One of the better examples of this sort of analysis is Fred A. Payne, ‘The strategic nuclear balance: a new measure’, Survival, xx:3 (May/June 1977)
Copyright information
© 1983 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Freedman, L. (1983). Parity. In: The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04271-5_24
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04271-5_24
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-04273-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-04271-5
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)