The strategic debates of the 1970s within the United States were as passionate as any that had gone before. After some delay, a challenge was mounted to the concepts developed during the McNamara period, in particular the notion of mutual assured destruction. Although an impressive critique was developed, attempts to create a compelling alternative were less successful. As confidence that a nuclear war could and would be fought in a specific way waned, the argument came to be heard that it was necessary to prepare to fight in almost any way. As uncertainty grew as to what dimension of military power created the desired deterrent effect on the Soviet Union, it was argued that imposing strength must be demonstrated on every dimension.
KeywordsMilitary Power Procurement Process Military Technology Force Planning Triad Concept
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