The European Nuclear Option (i) Anglo-Saxon Views

Abstract

As controversial as McNamara’s desire to improve the Alliance’s conventional option was his desire to dissuade the Europeans from developing their own nuclear options. The distaste for the independent nuclear deterrents was not solely a question of saving resources for conventional weapons. It was also related to concepts of controlled nuclear warfare, in which, even after the nuclear fire-break had been breached, an attempt would still be made to prevent matters getting out of hand. Reflecting the scientific bent of the time, and indicating the indeterminate possibilities for proliferation, the issue was then described as ‘The Nth Country Problem’, a term that has now happily passed out of fashion.¹ By giving anonymity to the offending country, the term suggested that the problems were similar whoever the Nth power might be. One of the frequent observations on this matter was that whereas the Nth power viewed his own acquisition of nuclear weapons as being fully justified, he would probably see any N + 1th power as a threat to world peace.