Abstract
At the centre of the strategy of stable conflict was the concept of incomplete antagonism. The prospect of an all-engulfing nuclear war reminded the super-powers that they should not push their differences over ideology and geopolitical interests too far. The issue was how far was too far. Arms control was concerned with preventing any sort of war, but an armed clash could not be ruled out. Would it be possible at low levels of violence for the shared interest in avoiding the most extreme form of military collision to continue to govern the resolution of the conflict? The question aroused mixed anxieties. If a war came, something other than the uninhibited release of all nuclear arsenals would be preferable, but knowledge that war-fighting would lead to something less than a complete disaster could make it more tempting for an aggressor. Moreover, a desire to limit the use of nuclear weapons could work to the advantage of the combatant with the strongest conventional capabilities — the USSR.
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Notes
Thorton Read, in Knorr and Read (eds.), Limited Strategic War, (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 93.
Herman Kahn, On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 138.
Kahn, On Escalation; Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966).
Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 19, 32, 34.
Morton Kaplan, The Strategy of Limited Retaliation, Policy Memorandum No. 19, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 9 April 1959.
See Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defence: ‘it cannot be too often repeated that the Soviets can never be sure of the degree of rationality in their victim’ (p. 164). For a discussion of this point see Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, (London: Sage Publications, 1977), Chap. Five.
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© 1983 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
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Freedman, L. (1983). Bargaining and Escalation. In: The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04271-5_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04271-5_14
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