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Abstract

Behind the whole argument about first-strike strategies was a crisis of identity for the military, and particularly for the Air Force. Such strategies offered the last best hope of fighting a nuclear war according to established military concepts. The idea of counter-force attacks could be traced to the early doctrines of strategic air bombardment and this provided a sense of continuity with former days. Apart from the problems created for the Western Alliance, if no feasible method could be found of executing a first strike successfully, the Air Force would be left without a means of engaging in a war that could bring victory in any plausible or tolerable way.

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Notes

  1. Charles Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

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  2. P. M. S. Blackett, Studies of War-Nuclear and Conventional, p. 201. For a brief history see Chapter 3 of Andrew Wilson, War Gaming (London: Pelican, 1970).

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  3. Sir Solly Zuckerman, ‘Judgement and control in modern warfare’, Foreign Affairs, XXXX: 2 (January 1962), p. 208.

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  4. Dr Samuel Glasstone, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (US Atomic Energy Commission, 1957) is the most authoritative compilation.

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  5. Albert Wohlstetter, ‘Strategy and the Natural Scientists’, in Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright (ed), Scientists and National Policy Making (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 189, 193, 195.

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  6. Sir Solly Zuckerman, Scientists and War, The Impact of Science on Military and Civil Affairs (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1956), p. 63.

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  7. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944).

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  8. Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961), p. 48.

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  9. See Glenn Snyder, ‘“Prisoner’s Dilemma” and “Chicken” models in international politics’, International Studies Quarterly, XV: 1 (March 1971).

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© 1983 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

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Freedman, L. (1983). The Formal Strategists. In: The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04271-5_12

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