Abstract
Britain had now, although somewhat tentatively, committed herself to non-intervention both in the Agreement and in the setting up of a committee of co-ordination. Over the next two years many efforts were made to bolster this commitment. Ever since then contradictory criticisms of these efforts have been made. It has been argued on the one hand that non-intervention was farcical and unable to prevent massive intervention by Italy, Russia and Germany. On the other hand it is claimed that non-intervention prevented France from aiding the Republic. If either of these views is true, then clearly the role of the British Government in supporting non-intervention was crucial to the outcome of the Spanish Civil War. Here it is proposed to examine the efficacy of the actual machinery of non-intervention: its powers and limitations as imposed by the agreement, the Committee, and later by the Control Scheme.
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Notes to Chapter 2
The best analysis of legal aspects of the Non-Intervention Agreement and Committee remains that of N.J. Padelford’s International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife, ( New York: Macmillan, 1939 ).
See Angel Vinas, El Oro Expanol en la Guerra Civil ( Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Ministerio de Hacienda, 1976 ) p. 28.
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© 1979 Jill Edwards
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Edwards, J. (1979). Non-Intervention. In: The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04003-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-04003-2_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-04005-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-04003-2
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