A Neuropsychological Theory of Cognitive Structures

Abstract

One aim of neuropsychologists is to explain cognitively organised actions in terms of the neurosciences. As a rule scientists refrain from asking ‘why’ questions, but ask ‘how’ questions, since they aim to explain how various classes of mechanisms could account for specific classes of behaviour. To explain something by mechanisms one assumes initial conditions, thereby avoiding endless explanatory regresses, such as ‘What caused X?’, answer ‘Y’; ‘What caused Y?’, answer ‘Z’; and so on indefinitely (cf. Wassermann, 1974, p. 110). Explanations in terms of mechanisms also avoid resort to metaphorical ‘agents’ (for example, ‘the will’) or teleological terms (for example, ‘purposes’, ‘intentions’, ‘wishes’, ‘motives’ and similar expressions). Since behaviour scientists deal with classes of behaviour phenomena, they do not ask questions about idiosyncratic behaviour, such as ‘Why did A do B, when he could have done something else instead?’ Explanations of idiosyncratic behaviour always demand never-ending ad hoc hypotheses, which are not inherent in any class of mechanisms considered. Admittedly initial conditions are invariably also selected on an ad hoc basis, but their possible choice is usually severely restricted by the mechanisms considered. Mechanisms have the additional advantage that they can often be studied by isolating part of a total system. The analytical method has the advantage of restricting one’s discourse. It avoids involving researchers in undecidable issues, raised by certain philosophers.