Survival and Consolidation

Abstract

The new year began with Anglo-American strategic discussions in Washington, and much talk, expectation and hope of a Second Front in Europe in 1942. Now that strategic planning was more firmly focused on the offensive, and it became clearer than ever that SOE’s work would be subordinated to the general strategic directives of the Chiefs of Staff, its independent existence came under close scrutiny. Attempts were made to restrict the scope of its activities, or even to abolish it. The Foreign Office, as the previous chapter has shown, were concerned at its encroachment on foreign policy matters and sought greater control or influence over SOE policy. The Allied governments-in-exile wished both to exert stronger control over SOE operations in occupied Europe, and to be more closely and directly associated with the Chiefs of Staff in the planning of a Second Front, thus bypassing SOE. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) claimed its own priorities in areas of Europe clearly earmarked for future invasion, and SO E-SIS relations became particularly problematic. These various claims and interests converged to create a major crisis for SOE in the late winter and early spring. This was surmounted, and SOE received its second directive from the Chiefs of Staff in May. The rest of the year saw the slow development of networks and an increasing number of agents infiltrated into Europe.