Throughout this book, we have argued good to be the end of all human striving—we have composed an extended footnote to the ancient definition of the good as ‘that for which all things strive’. But in so doing, we have consistently taken the existence of desires to be the fundamental datum. That certain desires exist has been the brute fact; we have neither asked for nor allowed explanations of their existence. Such questions lay beyond the metaphysical limits of our position. Putting it more brutally, ‘I just want it’ has been made the final word in all questions of value. Is this not an infantile and anarchic position? Why should desires exist at all, and why should those desires exist which do? Why should we ever expect ourselves to be able to persuade others of the desirability of certain states of affairs?
KeywordsModel Universe Brute Fact Mechanistic View Teleological Explanation Psychological Basis
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