Abstract
Whatever be the theories about the ātman held by the various thinkers during the time of the Buddha and thereafter, the Buddhist doctrine of anattā, as preserved in the Theravāda tradition, contradicts them all in an all-embracing sweep. NyānaponikaThera, a German monk who lived in Sri Lanka for many years, gives expression to the Theravāda view when he describes ‘belief in a self, a soul, or an eternal substance of any description’ as ‘the deepest and most obstinate delusion in man.’1 The argument against the âtman theories is two-fold — analytical and ethical.
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3 The.No-Soul Theory
Visuddhi Magga, Ch. 18. H. C. Warren, Buddhism in Translations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1909) p. 185.
Visuddhi Magga, Ch. 18. Quoted by Nyānatiloka, Buddhist Dictionary (Colombo: Frewin and Co., 1956) p. 97.
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© 1979 Lynn A de Silva
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de Silva, L.A. (1979). The No-Soul Theory. In: The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity. Library of Philosophy and Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03729-2_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03729-2_3
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