Abstract
The conference ended with a general discussion, the first part of which had as its theme the strategic power of the USSR and its implications for the West. Many of the contributors to the debate were concerned with the motivation behind the build-up of Soviet Power. The function of military power was defined within the framework of Soviet ideology: Marxism-Leninism regarded military capability as one of the means by which a correlation of forces more favourable to the Soviet Union and the progressive camp could gradually be brought about. Stalin had still envisaged that this process would ultimately entail war, but under the impact of nuclear weapons his successors had revised this view. The international class struggle and support for national liberation movements would continue; meanwhile the policy of detente and arms control negotiations would keep the risk of general war low. The growth of Soviet strength would produce an accumulation of quantitative change leading ultimately to qualitative change.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1979 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Erickson, J., Feuchtwanger, E.J. (1979). Conclusion. In: Erickson, J., Feuchtwanger, E.J. (eds) Soviet Military Power and Performance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03437-6_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03437-6_10
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-03439-0
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-03437-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)