In the last chapter scientific theories were portrayed as consisting of structures of interrelated generalisations. Can we seriously aspire to such theories in the social realm? An obvious initial objection is that social reality is simply much too complicated to succumb to such analysis. Surely the complex processes of social development will not lend themselves easily to exceptionless generalisations of the form, ‘Whenever A, then always B’.
KeywordsStatistical Association Skin Infection Causal Explanation Causal Connection Confounding Influence
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