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Restrictive Practices by Multinational Corporations: the Design for Multilateral Action

  • H. Ralph Windle

Abstract

It is perhaps of some advantage to be able to look at this topic from a viewpoint involving three quite different sets of experience. The first is that of having been tucked within the command structure of a major multinational company for a number of years. The second is, at this point in time, to be able to look at it with the supposed objectivity and detachment of an academician with the opportunities for research and enquiry which that affords. And finally, simultaneously with the latter, from the point of view of one who, as an adviser to the National Economic Development Office in London, has some involvement in the current developments on the national and international level concerning multinationals. It has always been the case that the special problems presented by the strategies and operations of such corporations have made analysis of their activities a subject which spans the normal disciplinary grasp of people in the business-academic world hovering between the fields of the economist, financial and marketing expert and, increasingly, the political scientist.

Keywords

Foreign Firm Domestic Firm Multinational Corporation Transfer Price Multinational Firm 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. 1.
    Data on actors in the system from Bruno Fritsch, ‘Die Krise des Weltpolitischen Systems’, Die Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 5 January 1975, p. 13.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty(Chicago, 1960), p. 182.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    The 64th and 75th Federalist Papers are among the rare exceptions. Much later the problem was analysed by James Bryce, Modern Democracies (New York, 1921). For a recent review, see A. M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency (Boston, 1973 ).Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Japan’s failure to respond to U.S. demand on this issue [restraints on exports of synthetic and woollen textiles] in turn threatened to derail Senate ratification of the treaty returning to Japan jurisdiction over Okinawa...’ R. N. Cooper, ‘Trade Policy is Foreign Policy’, in A Reordered World, edited by R. N. Cooper (Washington D.C., 1973 ), p. 57.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    GATT, Agreement on Implementation of Article VI (Anti-dumping Code) (Geneva, 1969).Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    On the need to free at least some governmental policy-making functions from short-term considerations see Ralf Dahrendorf, ‘The Sixth Reith Lecture’, The Listener 2 January 1975, esp. p. 6.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Gerard Curzon 1977

Authors and Affiliations

  • H. Ralph Windle
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Oxford Centre for Management StudiesLondonUK
  2. 2.National Economic Development OfficeLondonUK

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