Abstract
In my account of the atomistic plan of the world, as presented to us by Russell and the Abhidharmists, I did not say anything about their treatment of volition. It is obvious that they had to give some analysis of what it is to do something deliberately, because it is an inescapable feature of human life. It would be a very one-sided picture, one feels, if we were all claimed to be passive observers of everything that happens to us. For we do things too. There are voluntary actions as well as mere awarenesses of sense-data and mental states. Russell and the Abhidharmists admit this, but what they have to say about deliberate actions does not fit happily into their overall scheme, as we shall see.
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© 1977 Chris Gudmunsen
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Gudmunsen, C. (1977). Two ‘Mental Acts’. In: Wittgenstein and Buddhism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03128-3_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03128-3_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-03130-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-03128-3
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