Abstract
After the escape from the Russellian/Abhidharmist primacy of privacy, it is not surprising that people reappear on the scene. But the way in which they are welcomed back is remarkable. Apart from specific arguments about personal identity, people are now assumed to exist from the start; and the whole question of whether, for example, the term ‘I’ refers to something or nothing is thrown out altogether.
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© 1977 Chris Gudmunsen
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Gudmunsen, C. (1977). Others and Myself. In: Wittgenstein and Buddhism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03128-3_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03128-3_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-03130-6
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-03128-3
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