Abstract
The acceptance of Keynes by America is commonly presented, at least by most economists who have described it, as the triumph of truth over error. The drama takes place on a high intellectual plane. It is between two rival concepts of the budget, the one asserting that the aim of fiscal policy should be to balance the budget, the other seeing it as the instrument for keeping the economy at full employment. Each concept is based on a different economic theory. The one sees the economy as self-restoring in the absence of interference, the other believes that it will remain stuck in depression unless continually pushed by the government. Over a 30-year period the second, or Keynesian, theory has gradually triumphed over the first. The completed process has been described as the Keynes—Kennedy Revolution, a coupling particularly dear to the heart of the American liberal economist. Although the economist likes to present the struggle between the two theories in intellectual terms, he emphaticaly denies that the two positions were of equal intellectual merit. Keynes had sufficiently exposed the intellectual errors of his opponents in his General Theory.
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Notes
Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (1947), p. 183.
H. Stein, The Fiscal Revolution in America (1969), p. 163.
J. K. Galbraith, Economics, Peace and Laughter (1971), p. 48.
J. A. Schumpeter, ‘John Maynard Keynes 1883–1946’, American Economic Review (September 1946); reprinted in J. A. Schumpeter, Ten Great Economists (19521), pp. 287–8.
R. Lekachman, The Age of Keynes (1969 edition), p. 111.
J. K. Galbraith, Money, Whence It Came, Where It Went (1975), p. 228.
D. Winch, Economics and Policy (1965), p. 220.
For careful surveys, see Herbert Pacher, Ex-Communist Witnesses (1962);
David Rees, Harry Dexter White (1973), pp. 200, 214–18.
Byrd L. Jones, ‘The Role of Keynesians in Wartime Policy and Postwar Planning 1940–46’, Selected Papers from American Economic Association Meeting 27–29 (December 1971), p. 125.
James Tobin, ‘The Intellectual Revolution in US Economic Policy Making’, University of Essex Noel Buxton Lecture (1966), p. 19.
Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Hitler: British Politics and British Policy 1933–1940 (1975), p. ix.
Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind (1950), p. 7.
This is the thesis of A. E. Holmans, United States Fiscal Policy 1945–1959 (1961), pp. xi, also Chapter 2. Holmans’s argument that it was deficit spending which alarmed businessmen more than anything else about the New Deal (p. 20) is not supported by Stein or Leuchtenberg.
Q. R. Polenberg (ed.) Radicalism and Reform in the New Deal (1972), pp. 4–5.
J. K. Galbraith, The Great Crash (1955).
Bernard Sternscher, Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal (1964), p. 95f.
For a particulary blunt statement of this fallacy, see Rexford G. Tugwell, F.D.R.: Architect of an Era (1967), Chapter 14.
William E. Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal 1932–40 (1963), p. 152.
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© 1978 Keynes College
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Skidelsky, R. (1978). The American Response to Keynes. In: Thirlwall, A.P. (eds) Keynes and Laissez-Faire. Keynes Seminars. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03076-7_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-03076-7_7
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