Optimal Taxation and Public Production with Budget Constraints
This paper proposes a formulation of problems of public economics—taxation, public production—within the framework of one-kind allocation models. It differs from the similar approaches by Boiteux and by Diamond and Mirrlees in that the (second-best) models are written in primal language—specifically without the use of indirect utility functions—and, thus, are nearer to usual Paretian formulations. The main topics are the conditions of production efficiency in the case of profit taxation, marketable public goods, and proportional indirect taxation with sectoral budget constraints.
KeywordsBudget Constraint Private Firm Public Economic Price Vector Public Enterprise
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