The Supply of Communal Goods and Revenue Sharing
The use of intergovernmental grants is found in most countries. Governments (especially central governments) that encompass relatively large jurisdictions frequently supplement with grants of funds the revenues of public units at more decentralised levels. These grants are of two basic types: conditional and unconditional (‘lump-sum’). Among the former, a common type is the matching grant, where the recipient government is required to allocate funds from its own sources, in a specified ratio to the grant.
KeywordsPublic Expenditure Communal Good Pareto Optimum Lorenz Curve Federal Taxis
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