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The Supply of Communal Goods and Revenue Sharing

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Abstract

The use of intergovernmental grants is found in most countries. Governments (especially central governments) that encompass relatively large jurisdictions frequently supplement with grants of funds the revenues of public units at more decentralised levels. These grants are of two basic types: conditional and unconditional (‘lump-sum’). Among the former, a common type is the matching grant, where the recipient government is required to allocate funds from its own sources, in a specified ratio to the grant.

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© 1977 International Economic Association

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Sheshinski, E. (1977). The Supply of Communal Goods and Revenue Sharing. In: Feldstein, M.S., Inman, R.P. (eds) The Economics of Public Services. International Economic Association Conference Volumes. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02917-4_11

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