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New Phenomenalism as an Account of Perceptual Knowledge

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Impressions of Empiricism

Part of the book series: Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures ((RIPL))

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Abstract

To be an Empiricist with respect to knowledge of the natural world, is to insist that all knowledge of that world is rooted in perceptual experience. All claims which go beyond the deliverances of the senses must, in the end, be justified by, and understood in terms of, relations holding between those claims and sensory data. Crucial to the Empiricist case, therefore, is an account of how perception can be a source of knowledge. How can sensory experiences provide, for the owner of those experiences, information about objects and events which exist independently of the experiences themselves?

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Notes

  1. J. Bennett, Locke, Berkely, Hume (Clarendon Press, 1971) chs II, III, VI, XIII

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  2. and his Kant’s Analytic (Cambridge University Press, 1966) esp. Chs 2, 3, 8, 9, 13–15.

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  3. P. F. Strawson, Individuals (Methuen, 1959) Pt I

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  4. and his The Bounds of Sense (Methuen, 1966) Pts 1, 2, 4.

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  5. J. M. Hinton, Experiences (Clarendon Press, 1973) esp. IIb.

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  6. For the debate about seeing as epistemic, see G. J. Warnock, ‘Seeing’, and

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  7. G.N.A. Vesey, ‘Seeing and Seeing AS’, both in R. J. Swartz, (ed.) Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing (Doubleday, 1965)

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  8. F. I. Dretske, Seeing and Knowing (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) esp. ch. 2

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  9. G. Pitcher, Perception (Princeton University Press, 1971).

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  10. F. N. Sibley has some useful remarks about ‘status concepts’ in his ‘Analysing Seeing’, in Perception, ed. Sibley (Methuen, 1971) pp. 122–3.

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  11. On the notion of an hypothesis without rivals, see H. Putnam’s ‘Other Minds’, in Logic and Art ed. R. Rudner and I. Scheffler (Bobbs-Merril, 1972) pp. 80–2.

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© 1976 Royal Institute of Philosophy

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Hobbs, A. (1976). New Phenomenalism as an Account of Perceptual Knowledge. In: Vesey, G. (eds) Impressions of Empiricism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02804-7_7

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