Abstract
What could an empirical theory of the Mind be? Surely one which demonstrated that questions about the existence of minds were empirical questions — to be decided by observation, by the senses. This in turn would require an explanation of the meaning of statements about minds or mental states in terms referring to observable events, states and objects.
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© 1976 Royal Institute of Philosophy
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Taylor, D.M. (1976). An Empirical Account of Mind. In: Vesey, G. (eds) Impressions of Empiricism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02804-7_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02804-7_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-02806-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-02804-7
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