Abstract
Chapter 3 discussed the ‘consensus’ on preferential agreements reached in 1967 and, also, the reasons for the adoption of a fairly moderate position on tariff preferences by the Johnson Administration in the United States. At the end of the Kennedy Round negotiations, which were considered successful by the United States, the Americans were fairly receptive to new ideas on preferential agreements, provided the compromise was respected. Thus in November 1967, the United States accepted the creation of a trade negotiations committee under the auspices of the GATT to oversee the application of the preference scheme between developing countries.
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Notes and References
Benjamin J. Cohen (ed.), American Foreign Economic Policy: Essays and Comments (New York: Harper & Row, 1968) pp. 29–31. Also see Corbet, ‘Industrial Tariffs and Economic Spheres of Influence’ in Corbet and Jackson (eds), op. cit., p. 179.
Lawrence B. Krause, European Economic Integration and the United States ( Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968 ), pp. 192–3.
See Malmgren, ‘Managing International Economic Conflicts’, Annals of International Studies, Geneva, 1972, p. 189.
See William Diebold, ‘United States Trade Policy: The New Political Dimensions,’ Foreign Affairs, New York, vol. 52. 1974, pp. 472–96.
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© 1977 Alfred Tovias and the Trade Policy Research Centre
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Tovias, A. (1977). European-American Confrontation over Preferential Agreements. In: Tariff Preferences in Mediterranean Diplomacy. Trade Policy Research Centre. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02770-5_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02770-5_5
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