European-American Confrontation over Preferential Agreements
Chapter 3 discussed the ‘consensus’ on preferential agreements reached in 1967 and, also, the reasons for the adoption of a fairly moderate position on tariff preferences by the Johnson Administration in the United States. At the end of the Kennedy Round negotiations, which were considered successful by the United States, the Americans were fairly receptive to new ideas on preferential agreements, provided the compromise was respected. Thus in November 1967, the United States accepted the creation of a trade negotiations committee under the auspices of the GATT to oversee the application of the preference scheme between developing countries.
KeywordsTrade Policy Reverse Preference Mediterranean Country Free Trade Area Trade Negotiation
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Notes and References
- 12.Benjamin J. Cohen (ed.), American Foreign Economic Policy: Essays and Comments (New York: Harper & Row, 1968) pp. 29–31. Also see Corbet, ‘Industrial Tariffs and Economic Spheres of Influence’ in Corbet and Jackson (eds), op. cit., p. 179.Google Scholar
- 13.Lawrence B. Krause, European Economic Integration and the United States ( Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968 ), pp. 192–3.Google Scholar
- 14.See Malmgren, ‘Managing International Economic Conflicts’, Annals of International Studies, Geneva, 1972, p. 189.Google Scholar