Abstract
My arguments could be characterised as a study of the requirements of consistency in ethical judgement. It has been part of my thesis that there are certain conditions which must be satisfied if this requirement is to be met and that, therefore, it is illogical to require consistency and to deny that these conditions can be fulfilled. In the course of this investigation I have made some positive statements about the prerequisites for logical consistency in moral judgement which lead to some conclusions and which open the possibility of further investigations about the nature of moral discourse.
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Reference
I. M. Crombie, ‘Moral Principles’, in I. T. Ramsey (ed.), Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy, p. 249.
Ibid., p. 249.
Cf. W. K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963 ) p. 92.
B. G. Mitchell, Law, Morality and Religion in a Secular Society ( London: Oxford University Press, 1967 ) pp. 87–102.
G. J. Warnock, The Object of Morality ( London: Methuen, 1970 ).
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© 1977 J. M. Brennan
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Brennan, J.M. (1977). Conclusions and Speculations. In: The Open-Texture of Moral Concepts. New Studies in Practical Philosophy. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02670-8_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02670-8_3
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