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Understanding and Validity in Moral Judgement

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The Open-Texture of Moral Concepts

Part of the book series: New Studies in Practical Philosophy ((NSPP))

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Abstract

People are sometimes perplexed about moral problems. They examine the features of a situation; they seek advice and engage in argument. This is something which requires explanation because perplexity results from a failure to understand, and it is not a universally held truth that moral problems are problems of the understanding. For example, J. Kemp quite clearly distinguishes moral behaviour from the manifestation of intelligence or skill. He notes that ‘being brave, and knowing how to handle one’s weapons, are both necessary conditions of being a good soldier’, but that there is an important difference in the way we explain failures in either of these respects: ‘The coward knows what to do, but does not do it; the incompetent soldier who cannot handle his weapons does not know what to do or how to do it.’1

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Reference

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Authors
  1. J. M. Brennan
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© 1977 J. M. Brennan

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Brennan, J.M. (1977). Understanding and Validity in Moral Judgement. In: The Open-Texture of Moral Concepts. New Studies in Practical Philosophy. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02670-8_1

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