Abstract
The description of phenomena and the communication of experiences are two principal and interdependent functions of language. The unambiguous description of a particular phenomenon excludes from consideration all other similar phenomena, but if the experience of the particular phenomenon is to be communicated to another person who has not observed the phenomenon, the description must in some way transcend the particular case. Otherwise, of course, communication is not possible. Thus the interaction between particularity and generality must be fundamental in linguistic communication. As an example one may take any noun from ordinary language. A noun has a dual function: first, it denotes a particular phenomenon or experience; second, it is a concept, that is, it also denotes a particular class of phenomena or experiences. The context in which the noun occurs may focus the attention on the particular significance, but the conceptual significance is the knowledge by means of which the particular case is understood.
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© 1972 T. Bergstein
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Bergstein, T. (1972). Remarks on the Conceptual Foundations of Science. In: Quantum Physics and Ordinary Language. Palgrave, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02590-9_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-02590-9_1
Publisher Name: Palgrave, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-18227-7
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-02590-9
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