Contingency and Cosmic Teleology
It is customary to contrast cosmological-type arguments with teleological-type arguments. The most useful distinction to be made here is perhaps indicated by speaking with T. Penelhum of Existential and Qualitative arguments.’ The former are concerned with the problem that there is a world at all; the latter with problems regarding the kind of world that is, problems not only of order but of value, meaning and so on. The soft argument from contingency is an Existential argument even though contingency may in a sense be said to be a kind of quality, for it deals with the ‘quality’ of existence rather than with the qualities of existence.
KeywordsQualitative Argument Explanatory Ultimacy Ontological Pluralism Provisional Acceptance Teleological Argument
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