The Macedonian Wars

  • M. Cary
  • H. H. Scullard

Abstract

At the same time as the Romans were rounding off their possessions in the western half of the Mediterranean they were laying the foundations of a dominion in its eastern basin. Their principal antagonists in the eastern Mediterranean were the Greeks. Between 800 and 500 b.c. the Greek people had occupied by sporadic colonisation the greater part of the Aegean seaboard and of the Black Sea coast. Their inability to combine their numerous city-states into a durable confederacy had been a bar to further expansion, and in the fourth century it had facilitated their conquest by king Philip II of Macedon. But by virtue of their superior culture the Greeks soon absorbed their half-civilised masters, and in the political sphere they came to play the part of allies rather than of subjects to the Macedonians. It was in partnership with the Greeks that Philip’s son Alexander overthrew the Persian Empire (334–325); and although the principal dynasties established on the ruins of that dominion were Macedonian, yet as a soldier of adventure, as an administrator, as a civilian settler, it was the Greek that reaped the chief fruits of Alexander’s campaigns.

Keywords

Economic Crisis Europe Shipping Amid Syria 

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Notes and References

  1. General works on the history of the Hellenistic world include CAH, vii—ix; W. W.Tarn and G. T. Griffith, Hellenistic Civilization (1952); M. Cary, A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 B.c.2 (1951, repr. 1963);Google Scholar
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Copyright information

© The representatives of the estate of the late M. Cary and H. H. Scullard 1975

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. Cary
    • 1
  • H. H. Scullard
    • 1
  1. 1.University of LondonUK

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